The Iranian Turning Point

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Updated May 11, 2012, 4:35 p.m. ET

The Iranian Turning Point


By SOHRAB AHMARI

Today, amid growing tensions with the Islamic Republic, Iranians are often deemed to possess little moral agency. When Iranian theocrats deny the Holocaust or demand a new one, we are told that such sentiments are a reaction to Western hostility, not a sincere hatred. Iranians are seen as lacking historical agency, too. Having once been the victims of colonial predation, they are now and forever exculpated from their own historical misdeeds.

The 1953 coup d'état against Iranian premier Muhammad Mossadegh is at the heart of this pious narrative. The episode entered the public imagination with the publication, not long after the 9/11 attacks, of journalist Stephen Kinzer's "All the Shah's Men." According to Mr. Kinzer, orchestrating the coup was the original sin from which America's subsequent troubles in Iran—and in the wider Mideast—sprang. Having aborted Mossadegh's "democratic rule" in favor of the tyrannical shah some five decades earlier, he claimed, the U.S. was now reaping punishment in the form of Islamist terror.

What he lacked in analytical probity, Mr. Kinzer made up for with a remarkable knack for popularization. Indeed, President Obama himself cited the Kinzer narrative in his Cairo address to the Muslim world, and later as a justification for refusing to speak out decisively in support of the 2009 post-election uprising in Iran. Yet over the past decade a number of corrective accounts—most notably, Abbas Milani's magisterial 2011 biography of the shah—have punctured the Kinzer myth and told a far different story. To this revisionist canon one must add, perhaps against the author's own wishes, "Patriot of Persia," Christopher de Bellaigue's biography of Mossadegh.

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Patriot of Persia: Muhammad Mossadegh and a Tragic Anglo-American Coup

By Christopher de Bellaigue

Harper, 310 pages, $27.99

Mr. de Bellaigue, a veteran Tehran correspondent for the Economist, quickly dismisses Mr. Kinzer's effort, which, owing to the latter's inability to read Persian, is "a bit like writing about Pearl Harbor knowing only Japanese." Mr. de Bellaigue, by contrast, navigates Persian-language sources with ease. He also writes with economy and a lightly ironic touch. The result is a three-dimensional profile of Mossadegh that contrasts sharply with the heroic democrat mythologized by his supporters. The Mossadegh he shows us is an insufferable if enlightened eccentric, a self-righteous demagogue who drove his country to the brink of economic suicide and brought about his own political demise.

Mossadegh was born in 1882, when Persia was a shabby empire ruled by the declining Qajar dynasty. Illiteracy and malaria also reigned. The oil era had not begun, but two imperial powers, Russia and Britain, vied for influence and for control over the Persian conduit to India. Mossadegh's family was tied by blood to the throne. His father, one of a very few honest royal revenue officers, impressed on the young Mossadegh an aversion to graft, and this would long be his most admired public quality. (Once he inherited his father's office, Mossadegh made a point of collecting unpaid taxes from his domineering mother, to her chagrin.)

But Qajar rule was corrupt to the core. At the dawn of the oil era, the court made one concession after another to the great powers—impervious to the nationalist urges that had gripped Persia's elites and spread to the bazaar and clergy. These stirrings exploded in a valiant 1905 revolt that resulted in the establishment of a parliament, the Majlis, but was ultimately crushed by Russian cannon. Mossadegh had been elected to the first parliament but was not a devoted reformer. During these heady days, Mr. de Bellaigue concludes, he at best "passed close to events, rather than plunged in," his constitutionalist sentiments "always coloured by traditional ideas of Muslim leadership, whereby the community chooses a man of outstanding virtue—and follows him wherever he takes them." He saw himself as that man and proved able to thrive in any political environment.

Throughout his career—two governorships, several ministerial postings and finally the premiership—Mossadegh was guided by a hardheaded insistence that Iran be absolutely independent, no matter the cost. When, in 1925, a Cossack officer named Reza deposed the Qajars, ascended the Peacock Throne with British support and embarked on an ambitious program of modernization, Mossadegh was cool to his plans. "What would happen if the roads were not paved and the buildings and guesthouses went un-built?" he asked in an essay published just after Reza's coup. "I wanted to walk over the earth and not suffer my country to be taken over by others."

Endowed with an "ostentatious combative morality" and a not entirely unjustified Anglophobia, Mossadegh viewed any reliance on foreigners as anathema. Most humiliating were the concession to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., which was allowed to extract and market oil reserves in the Persian Gulf region. The concession was predatory, and the British exchequer drew the major share of the profits.

Mossadegh was not interested in renegotiating the concession. He had his sights on nationalizing Iran's oil. His main vehicle was the Majlis, which had become a genuinely popular legislature not long after the Allies in 1941 forced Reza, citing his pro-Axis leanings, to abdicate in favor of his son, Mohammad Reza Shah. By the time the 69-year-old Mossadegh was appointed prime minister in 1951, he was an expert parliamentarian, using a combination of logical argument, procedural trickery and personal wrangling to get his every way. Shortly after he took office, the Majlis abrogated the oil concession. London was furious and quickly moved to apply sanctions that made sure Iran could export no oil.

His greatest asset was his personality, "a mixture of visionary and fusspot," in Mr. de Bellaigue's words. His melodramatic displays were legendary. Time and again, Mossadegh swooned, fainted and wept his way out of political impasses. Almost every setback was met with vows to resign and forever depart Iran. More often than not, these antics worked. Yet for all his eccentric charm, Mossadegh ultimately failed, as Mr. de Bellaigue puts it, to "strike that balance, between interests and ideals, of which a true politician is made."

Seeking a more equitable oil deal was a just and realistic goal—and one shared by the shah. The shy young monarch backed his ambitious, haughty premier through much of the oil struggle, but Mossadegh rarely reciprocated the shah's cooperation. Full nationalization at a time when the country lacked the means to extract, market or distribute oil was pure folly. The decision was economically catastrophic; the oil markets could get along perfectly well without Iran. For Mossadegh, however, the economy was a peripheral issue. He was obsessed with the "ultimate prize, oil and honor."

It was this political myopia that spelled Mossadegh's downfall. He neither accepted the best deal Iran was ever likely to be offered nor tempered his more radical supporters, including some who sympathized with the menacing, Soviet-aligned Tudeh Party. Eventually, the fragile national consensus that had characterized the early years of the shah's reign fractured under Mossadegh's obstinacy. Anti-Mossadegh rumblings began to reverberate through the bazaar and the seminaries.

Mossadegh responded by yielding to his "demagogic gene," bullying the Majlis into granting him plenary powers for a six-month duration in 1952, then seeking a yearlong extension. "He accused anyone doubting him of lacking patriotism," Mr. de Bellaigue writes. "He had arrogated to himself the authority to judge when and how the constitution should be applied."

By the time the CIA and MI6 moved to depose him, the secularist Mossadegh had lost the support of leading Islamists, with whom he had likely colluded to assassinate a pro-concession predecessor. Meanwhile, having once used Mossadegh's movement as a moral sword to advance Soviet interests, the Tudeh Party now sought to displace him as Iran's true secular opposition. Finally, Mossadegh's unwillingness to compromise with the court had cost him the shah's backing. Mossadegh had dissolved the Senate, canceled elections, and was governing by decree. Increasingly, the premier thought of himself as indispensable, and, Mr. de Bellaigue notes, "there is no reason to assume that this sense would have diminished had he not been toppled."

Washington watched these developments with growing concern. The Eisenhower administration was in containment mode, and a communist Iran was unacceptable. By flirting with the Tudeh, Mossadegh sought to pressure the U.S. to his side in the oil dispute with Britain. The bluff badly misfired. At anti-concession rallies, Mossadegh's nationalist forces mustered a few thousands of unorganized protesters. One famous Tudeh rally was attended by 100,000 disciplined Marxist cadres.

The CIA and MI6 went into joint action, spending money widely to encourage Mossadegh's removal. But—and this is a point Mr. de Bellaigue generally plays down—so did the rest of Iranian society. As Mr. Milani noted in his biography of the shah, "members of the Iranian middle class, merchants of the bazaar . . . and industrialists, were all particularly wary of the Tudeh Party's militant and assertive discourse." While CIA dollars and propaganda did have an effect, "the new swagger in the demeanor of the Tudeh Party leadership was probably in itself enough to foment these middle-class fears."

The extent of American involvement in Mossadegh's toppling is widely contested. Mr. de Bellaigue sees a major American role. His narrative—like Mr. Kinzer's of a decade ago—is marred by heavy reliance on pro-Mossadegh voices and on the memoirs of the alleged coup-masters themselves—above all that of Kermit Roosevelt (grandson of Theodore and CIA station chief in Tehran), who spent much of his long life spinning self-aggrandizing yarns in Washington. Mr. Milani described Roosevelt's personality as "part Hollywood, part Rudyard Kipling, with a pinch of 'Bond, James Bond.' "

According to Mr. de Bellaigue, Western connivance was the direct and proximate cause of Mossadegh's fall. It is true that Roosevelt and his colleagues doled out thousands of dollars to buy the allegiance of newspaper editors and to mobilize ragtag gangs of roughnecks, prostitutes and other lumpen elements. Still it does not follow that, but for Anglo-American intervention, Mossadegh would have remained in power.

Mr. Milani, for example, is far more cautious in his account, contending that "while there seems to overwhelming evidence that some funds were disbursed among some street toughs and gang leaders, it is not clear to what extent the appearance of these gangs was the result of that money"—or of the preaching of Islamist ideologues who had turned on their erstwhile ally. The coup planned by the CIA for Aug. 15, 1953, failed to depose Mossadegh and the shah fled. The crowds that marched through Tehran on Aug. 19 seem to have been largely spontaneous.

The dispute may never be settled. Yet the preponderance of evidence gathered in Mr. de Bellaigue's own book makes one thing clear: The balance of social forces had turned against Mossadegh well before any coup. It's unfortunate, then, that Mr. de Bellaigue succumbs to some of the same Kinzerian clichés, concluding his text with trite ruminations about the "progressive" and "democratic" Iran that could have been had the West allowed Mossadegh to remain in power. In fact, if there is a lesson to be drawn from this otherwise compelling biography, it is that to find freedom, Iranians must begin taking credit for having authored their own tragedy.
—Mr. Ahmari is an Iranian-American journalist and a nonresident associate research fellow at the Henry Jackson Society.

A version of this article appeared May 12, 2012, on page C5 in some U.S. editions of The Wall Street Journal, with the headline: The Iranian Turning Point.

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July 22, 2012

Iranian assets in United States mosques, universities activated for potential terrorist attacks
Published: 2:11 AM 07/22/2012
By Reza Kahlili
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Emirati police and other officials inspect a boat docked in a fishing harbor in the Jumeirah district of Dubai, United Arab Emirates, Monday, July 16, 2012. A U.S. official in Dubai says an American vessel has fired on a boat off the coast of the United Arab Emirates, killing one person and injuring three. The official gave no further details, but it appears the boat could have been mistaken as a threat in Gulf waters not far from Iran's maritime boundaries. (AP Photo/Almoutasim Almaskery)

Iranian assets positioned in the United States have been activated and are actively working to acquire intelligence and equipment that might be useful in terror attacks, according to a former member of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards.

The information comes after a bus carrying Israeli youths exploded Wednesday in a Black Sea resort in Bulgaria, killing six and injuring 30 others. Fire engulfed the bus after the attack, which occurred as the bus was on its way back to the youths’ hotel.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu blamed Iran and vowed to retaliate.

Ominously, the attack took place on the anniversary of the Jewish Community Center bombing in Buenos Aires, Argentina that killed 85 and injured more than 100 in 1994. Several Iranian officials were implicated in that attack, including the current Iranian defense minister, Ahmad Vahidi, who has been red-flagged by Interpol.

Assets of the regime have attacked Israeli officials and interests unsuccessfully before, such as in India, Bangkok, Azerbaijan and other places. However, as reported in March, the Islamic regime had warned America and Israel that the next terror attacks would be much more complex and devastating.

A source who served in the Revolutionary Guards’ intelligence unit and has now defected to a European country warned in April that the Islamic regime’s terror cells were on high alert, which includes for attacks in the U.S.

According to that source, and another located in the U.S., the regime’s assets have long infiltrated America and are coordinating operations out of mosques and Islamic centers, such as Imam Ali Mosques and the Iman Islamic Center.

Hundreds of the families of the regime officials who are present in America and Canada, in collaboration with the Iranian Embassy in Canada and Interests Section of The Islamic Republic of Iran out of the Pakistani Embassy in Washington, D.C., are also actively recruiting assets and gathering intelligence.

The relatives routinely travel back and forth to Iran, making it easy to pass on information and transfer cash from Iran to the U.S.

Iran’s intelligence apparatus is specifically wooing Americans who convert to Islam. These individuals are approached with offers of a trip to the city of Qom, the hotbed of seminaries in Iran and the center of Shia theology, where they are brainwashed and then approached for collaboration against the infidels.

Hassan Abassi, a former intelligence commander of the Guards and the current strategist of the regime, has stated that Iranian assets in America who would conduct terrorism are not necessarily Iranian and that many are American, Mexican and of Latin American origin.

The source indicated that the recruiters and the regime’s intelligence officers often gather at mosques and Islamic centers. They identify individuals within the Islamic student associations and others who might sympathize with the Islamic regime and try to recruit them.

The regime’s Islamic foundations, such as Al-Ghadir and AhlulBayt, have set up branches throughout the world, including in America, funding mosques and Islamic centers that gather intelligence, recruit and transfer of cash to the regime’s cells.

Many other assets are already working at high-tech companies in the U.S., according to the source. These assets seek to gain access on communications by Iranians who are active in America in opposing the regime and also to gain technological secrets, which then are passed on to the regime.

Others have been placed in universities across the U.S. to gain critical knowledge to help with Iran’s nuclear arms program, while others promote better ties with Iran through various organizations and think tanks, which also provide the Islamic regime with analyses on the state of American public opinion.

Some assets are used to purchase spare parts that, due to the sanctions, the regime is unable to obtain. Many have been arrested trying to export airplane parts, parts for fighter jets and helicopters and other military and commercial parts.

With the Islamic regime refusing to halt its nuclear program and its looming confrontation with the West, the regime strategy calls for further terrorist attacks by its assets to send a signal to the West that an attack on its nuclear facilities will bear dire consequences, said the source in Europe.

“They are closing in on getting the bomb,” he said. “At that time it will be too late to stop this regime.”

Reza Kahlili is a pseudonym for a former CIA operative in Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and the author of the award winning book, A Time to Betray. He is a senior Fellow with EMPact America, a member of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security and teaches at the U.S. Department of Defense’s Joint Counterintelligence Training Academy (JCITA).

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July 24, 2012

CAIR pushes DoD to drop ex-CIA operative lecturer, claims anti-Islam
Published: 11:25 AM 07/24/2012
By Caroline May

The Council on American Islamic Relations is urging the Pentagon to drop a former CIA operative inside Iran’s Revolutionary Guards as a lecturer at the Department of Defense’s Joint Counterintelligence Training Academy.

The group claims that the views of the former operative, who has been teaching, writing and lecturing about the dangers Iran poses to the West under the pseudonym Reza Kahlili, is anti-Islam and promoting his own agenda as a former Muslim.

“This is yet another unfortunate example of our nation’s military and counterterrorism personnel being trained by individuals who weaken America’s security by promoting their own religious and political agendas,” wrote CAIR national Executive Director Nihad Awad in a letter sent to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Monday.

According to Kahlili, who reports for The Daily Caller on a freelance basis, his lectures at the JCITA are about the intelligence operation of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, not Islam. He noted, however, that CAIR’s distaste for him probably stems from the intersections between the two.

“CAIR is likely upset with my articles and news pieces on the fact that the guards intelligence also runs operations out of Islamic centers and Mosques,” Kahlili explained to TheDC in an email. “If they truly care about the Islamic community in America and the sanctity of the Mosque, they should welcome such information and help authorities to weed out such operators from ordinary Muslims so that another 09/11 does not take place.”

Kahlili explained that with his focus on Iranian human rights and the threat the regime and its allies pose to Western nations he has been surprised by CAIR’s reaction.

“CAIR’s attack surprises me,” Kahlili explained. “In becoming a spy for the CIA while a member of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, I not only risked my life but those of my loved ones to protect the security of America and the Free World and raise awareness of the brutality Iranians suffer under a regime that has no mercy, even for women and children.”

Kahlili added that CAIR has judged him for converting to Christianity. He pointed to the group’s press release reference to his conversion as proof.

CAIR is the largest Muslim advocacy group in America and was an unindicted co-conspirator in the Holy Land Foundation terror funding trial.

They have been successful with previous requests for more sensitivity from the Pentagon, including recently bringing an end to the use of Muslim women in hijabs and Quran verses as targets for Navy SEAL training at Joint Base Fort Story in Virginia Beach, Va. and terminating another instructor at the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Va. for advocating “total war” against Islam.

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